Clues for consequentialists by Burch-Brown, Joanna M
                          Burch-Brown, J. M. (2014). Clues for consequentialists. Utilitas, 26.
10.1017/S0953820813000289
Link to published version (if available):
10.1017/S0953820813000289
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms.html
Take down policy
Explore Bristol Research is a digital archive and the intention is that deposited content should not be
removed. However, if you believe that this version of the work breaches copyright law please contact
open-access@bristol.ac.uk and include the following information in your message:
• Your contact details
• Bibliographic details for the item, including a URL
• An outline of the nature of the complaint
On receipt of your message the Open Access Team will immediately investigate your claim, make an
initial judgement of the validity of the claim and, where appropriate, withdraw the item in question
from public view.
Utilitas
http://journals.cambridge.org/UTI
Additional services for Utilitas:
Email alerts: Click here
Subscriptions: Click here
Commercial reprints: Click here
Terms of use : Click here
Clues for Consequentialists
JOANNA M. BURCH-BROWN
Utilitas / FirstView Article / January 2014, pp 1 - 15
DOI: 10.1017/S0953820813000289, Published online: 02 January 2014
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0953820813000289
How to cite this article:
JOANNA M. BURCH-BROWN Clues for Consequentialists . Utilitas, Available on
CJO 2014 doi:10.1017/S0953820813000289
Request Permissions : Click here
Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/UTI, IP address: 82.26.197.32 on 03 Feb 2014
Clues for Consequentialists
JOANNA M. BURCH-BROWN
University of Bristol
In an influential paper, James Lenman argues that consequentialism can provide no basis
for ethical guidance, because we are irredeemably ignorant of most of the consequences
of our actions. If our ignorance of distant consequences is great, he says, we can have
little reason to recommend one action over another on consequentialist grounds. In this
article, I show that for reasons to do with statistical theory, the cluelessness objection is
too pessimistic. We have good reason to believe that certain patterns of action will tend to
have better consequences, and we have good reason to recommend acting in accordance
with strategies based on those advantageous patterns. I close by saying something about
the strategies that this argument should lead us to favour.
In his 2000 paper entitled ‘Consequentialism and Cluelessness’, James
Lenman argues that consequentialism can provide no basis for ethical
guidance.1 Our actions have profoundly far-reaching consequences,
only a small portion of which are within view when we make our
decisions. There is every reason to think that overall consequences
will largely be determined by unforeseeable ones, and there is no
reason to believe one thing or another about how these unforeseeable
consequences will turn out. In our epistemically impoverished states,
maximizing subjective expected utility is hardly more promising as
a strategy for bringing about better consequences overall than, say,
choosing acts randomly or choosing the acts that look worst.2
For reasons related to statistical theory, Lenman’s account is too
pessimistic. We have good reason to think that murder tends to
have terrible consequences. We also have grounds for making many
other consequentialist judgements. Of course, we will often make
mistakes, including believing that we have a more accurate view of
1 J. Lenman, ‘Consequentialism and Cluelessness’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 29
(2000), pp. 342–70.
2 See also: G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (London, 1903), ch. 5, secs. 93–100; S. Kagan,
Normative Ethics (Boulder, 1998), p. 64; D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford, 1987);
R. Frazier, ‘Act-Utilitarianism and Decision Procedures’, Utilitas 6 (1997), pp. 241–8;
E. Wiland, ‘Monkeys, Typewriters, and Objective Consequentialism’, Ratio 18 (2005),
pp. 352–60; F. Howard-Snyder, ‘The Rejection of Objective Consequentialism’, Utilitas 9
(1997), pp. 241–8; E.Mason, ‘Consequentialism and the Principle of Indifference’,Utilitas
16 (2004), pp. 316–21; D. Miller, ‘Actual-Consequence Act-Utilitarianism and the Best
Possible Humans’, Ratio 16 (2003), pp. 49–62; G. Lang, ‘Consequentialism, Cluelessness,
and Indifference’, The Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (2008), pp. 477–85. An account that
might be interesting to compare with my own is C. Hare, ‘Obligation and Regret When
There is No Fact of the Matter About What Would Have Happened if You Had Not Done
What You Did’, Nouˆs 45 (2011), pp. 190–206.
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the consequences than we do. Nevertheless, I shall argue that we have
more reason for optimism than Lenman supposes.
I begin by introducing the cluelessness objection, along with the
limitations of one popular response. I then present some basic
statistical theory. This theory suggests that if we repeat similar actions
many times under similar circumstances, the overall consequences
will tend to be determined by whichever effects are systematically
associated with the sort of actions we have taken, and the innumerable
other influenceswill tend in the long run towash out. Thus our ability to
give good consequentialist guidance does not depend upon knowing all
of the diverse causal factors that will influence the outcome of isolated
actions. Rather, it depends upon knowing the main systematic effects
of the sorts of actions that we are considering, and then acting on the
basis of those systematic effects.
When it comes to actions for which we cannot reasonably hope to
evaluate the systematic effects, we have little reason for optimism.
Thus my argument by no means justifies an indiscriminate assumption
that unforeseeable consequences will balance out, nor does it suggest
that consequentialists have a strong basis for guidance in all
circumstances. It favours a more limited conclusion: we have a good
basis for providing consequentialist guidance just in so far as we are in
a position to evaluate the systematic effects of the sorts of actions we
are considering.
CLUELESSNESS
Lenman worries that, for many actions, the portion of consequences
we foresee is minute compared to the portion we do not. To make his
case, Lenman focuses on acts that have highly unpredictable influences
upon which future agents come to exist. Drawing on various examples
concerning the reproductive choices of Hitler’s ancient ancestors,
Lenman argues that many acts influence which people come to exist,
and that these acts are implicated counterfactually in the vast arrays
of good and bad things that those future agents get up to. The agents
who come to exist if I choose Amay get up to very different things from
the agents who come to exist if I choose B. Surely the difference in
good produced by one line of descendants and another will be of greater
magnitude than the foreseeable expected advantage of my act.
Sometimes our influence on which agents come to exist will be direct,
as when we make decisions about whether and when to have children,
or when we make a concerted effort to save lives by contributing to
UNICEF or Oxfam. At other times, the influence will be indirect. Say
that Ida decides not to go to a New Year’s party. Had she gone, she
would have introduced her friend Max to a fellow attendee, who would
Clues for Consequentialists 3
have recommended a particular bed and breakfast for a holiday in the
hills. At that bed and breakfast, Max would have fallen in love with
the gardener next door, and they would have gone on to raise a family
together. Thus Ida’s decision not to go to the New Year’s party has
far-reaching repercussions that are quite impossible for her to foresee;
many of our acts will have such indirect repercussions, and we often
cannot tell in advance which acts these will be.
Lenman’s most prominent example is of two people living many
centuries ago. Bandit Richard is on a murderous rampage, but he
decides in a moment of conscience to spare the life of a young
woman, Angie. Having been spared by Richard, Angie lives and goes
on to have a child. A hundred generations later, Adolf Hitler turns
out to be one of her descendants. Had Richard carried on with his
rampage, the Holocaust might never have happened. In objective
act-consequentialist terms, therefore, Richard’s choice to spare Angie
has marks against it – a disquieting suggestion. Yet, Lenman says,
the consequentialist is in no position to say one thing or another
about Richard’s action, for who knows what would have happened had
Richard gone on to kill Angie? Perhaps, he says, killing Angie would
have led to the birth of Malcolm the Truly Appalling. The unforeseeable
consequences of either murder or not murder are so vast that the
consequentialist has almost nothing to go on.With no grounds on which
to reason about the balance of these hidden effects, Lenman argues, we
should resist the temptation to assume that they will behave in any
well-mannered way, such as tending on the whole to balance out.
Although his headline example involves extreme events, Lenman’s
worry is not about bad luck in rare cases. It is about our pervasive
ignorance at every scale of action, from everyday common encounters
to large-scale strategic projects. Ending smallpox has overwhelmingly
positive foreseeable effects. But the unforeseeable effects of such large-
scale projects are also enormous, involving the survival or death of
entire populations of future agents. Given how much is hidden from us
concerning the overall actions of entire populations of possible people,
the consequences we foresee will remain dwarfed by those we do not.3
On Lenman’s account, if we ought to prevent smallpox or prohibit
murder, it is because of non-consequentialist moral requirements –
not because we can reasonably claim to have evaluated the overall
effects.
3 Tyler Cowen suggests that cluelessness only undermines small-scale actions, and
not large-scale ones. But it seems reasonable toworry that larger-scale actionswill tend to
have comparably greater hidden consequences, in which case it is not clear that Cowen’s
argument overcomes the cluelessness objection. T. Cowen, ‘The Epistemic Problem does
not refute Consequentialism’, Utilitas 18 (2006), pp. 383–99.
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SUBJECTIVE CONSEQUENTIALISM AND CLUELESSNESS
In light of epistemic considerations, many consequentialists favour a
move to subjective consequentialism. Whereas objective consequen-
tialists suggest that the rightness of an act depends on its actual
consequences, subjective consequentialists focus on reasonable beliefs.
They hold that right actions are those which a reasonable and
conscientious agent would identify as having the best subjectively
expectable consequences.4
In calculating subjective expected utility, the agent discounts the
value of each possible outcome in proportion with how confident she
is that it will take place. When it comes to outcomes of which she is
entirely ignorant, the rational thing is to equivocate – to treat all such
outcomes as equally likely, and thus without influence in her decision.
Indeed it is sometimes argued that we are obliged, as a requirement of
rationality, to treat irredeemably hidden consequences as equally likely,
in much the same way that we are obliged to ignore the possibility that
the sun will not rise tomorrow.5
Subjective consequentialism has an appealing practicability since it
associates rightness with a standard that is epistemically accessible
to agents, rather than being determined by external facts to which an
agent may or may not have access. Moreover, focusing on an agent’s
reasonable beliefs allows evaluation of acts to be closely related to
evaluation of blameworthiness and responsibility. This is attractive,
since it means that a subjective consequentialist standard might play
a unifying role in relation to many of the subjects in which we are
interested when we come to studying ethics.
Nevertheless, subjective consequentialism is made less attractive by
epistemic worries. If we are largely ignorant of what will tend to be for
the better, it is hard to see what reason there could be for us to follow
subjective consequentialist recommendations. A theory holding that we
should try to bring about better consequences will be more attractive
if we have reason to believe that our efforts will tend to pay off in the
long run.
Of course, wemay be tempted to think that in the absence of evidence
one way or another, it will generally be the case that our subjective
4 Such views have been discussed at length and by many, but see for instance F.
Howard-Snyder, ‘It’s the Thought that Counts’, Utilitas 17 (2005), pp. 265–81. For an
in-depth study of perspectives on subjective rightness, see H. M. Smith, ‘Subjective
Rightness’, Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 27 (2010), pp. 64–110.
5 See e.g. Mason, ‘Consequentialism and the Principle of Indifference’; W. Shaw,
Moore on Right and Wrong (Dordrecht 1995), pp. 114–20: D. Dorsey, ‘Consequentialism,
Metaphysical Realism and the Argument from Cluelessness’, Philosophical Quarterly
62 (2012), pp. 48–70. See also W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ‘Consequentialism’, Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2011).
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expectations will reflect the way things are with the world, and thus
that maximizing subjective expected utility is indeed a good strategy
for bringing about better consequences.
Alastair Norcross argues for this optimistic conclusion in his paper
‘Consequentialism and the Unforeseeable Future’.6 In his primary
example, a capricious ruler requires you to decide whether Smith will
live or die, and a chance mechanism links your choice to the saving or
killing of 7 million other people. A coin is flipped out of view. If you
choose to save Smith and the coin lands heads, then 7 million other
people will also be saved, while if it lands tails, 7 million others will
be killed. Conversely, if you choose to let Smith die and the coin lands
heads, then 7 million people will be killed alongside him, while if it
lands tails, then the 7 million others will be saved. Even though chance
is involved, Norcross concludes that you ought to save Smith, and to
expect that making decisions of that sort over and over will probably
yield a benefit overall.
Norcross proposes that our real-world decisions are analogous to this
example. Although the outcomes beyond our control may be vast and
depend on chance, if we act with the expected utilities, then the net
effect in the long run should be beneficial.
The problem with Norcross’s example is that his chance mechanism
exploits physical symmetries. Knowing the set-up, we are led to assume
that the physical probabilities are evenly balanced for and against
us, because the outcome is being decided by the flip of an implicitly
symmetrical, fairly balanced coin. Thus the example builds physical
symmetry into the picture just where Lenman thinks we can make no
symmetry assumptions.
That means that in Norcross’s example our subjective probabilities
unambiguously match up with the physical ones, thus motivating his
correct inference that maximizing subjective expected utility in this
case will reliably bring about better consequences. But in decision
situations in which we do not have access to similar evidence about
objective probabilities, our subjective probabilities will be evenly
distributed out of ignorance, not out of positive evidence about how
the world is; and so it seems that we have little basis for believing
that our choice of acts will yield better consequences than choosing at
random.
To see why this is problematic, consider what happens if we drop
the assumption that the coin is evenly balanced. Once we do this,
then the subjective probabilities and objective probabilities come apart.
6 A. Norcross, ‘Conseqentialism and the Unforeseeable Future’, Analysis 50 (1990),
pp. 253–6.
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If the coin is biased just slightly, at .49 heads and .51 tails, then
saving Smith will have an objective expectation of killing 139,999
people, whereas letting him die will have an objective expectation of
saving 139,999 people. If we choose to save lots of Smiths under these
circumstances, we will probably wind up letting hundreds of thousands
of people die. Given that the error systematically works against us
in this case, we would have a much better chance of saving lives by
choosing at random, rather than choosing on the basis of foreseeable
consequences.
As this example suggests, it is important not to take ignorance of
unforeseeable consequences as evidence that they will tend to balance
out. AsMichael Strevens puts it, ‘the nature of the world is independent
of our epistemic deficits. The fact we do not know anything about A does
not constrain the way things are with A.’7 If we do not have reason to
think that the coin is fairly balanced, and we do not have evidence
about the direction in which it is biased, then we will not be justified in
expecting our recommendations to yield better outcomes – we will just
be justified in admitting ignorance.
However, there is a second lesson to be found in this example,
which is that we often assign equal probabilities not out of mere
ignorance, but as an expression of reasonable background beliefs. It
is not unreasonable to think that the coin is likely to be fair or indeed
biased towards heads – after all, most real coins are. Since we know
something about what coins are generally like, it makes sense in
Norcross’s example to think that we have a reasonable basis onwhich to
make a decision. Of course, we also know something else about this case,
which is that it is a set-up by a capricious dictator. Capricious dictators
are likely to take pleasure in other people’s discomfort. That gives
us less reason to think that the coin is equally balanced, leaving the
example rather less benign. But the general point holds, regardless of
which of these considerations we find more compelling. In deliberating
about what to do, we often draw on background beliefs which give us
some reasonable basis for assigning probabilities.
The question, then, is whether the consequentialist can ever
justify holding optimistic background beliefs about the far-reaching
consequences of our actions (such as the belief that chancy and
unforeseen consequences will tend to wash out) given the vast arrays
of inscrutable causal influences that will shape those consequences. In
the rest of this article I will argue that we do have a reasonable basis
for some such beliefs.
7 M. Strevens, ‘Inferring Probabilities from Symmetries’, Noˆus 32 (1998), pp. 231–46.
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STATISTICAL THEORY, PREDICTION AND PATTERNS
Statistical theory gives us greater reason for optimism about predicting
consequences than Lenman supposes. The key lies in switching focus
from individual events to broader patterns, and probabilities based
on them. Predicting patterns is often less demanding than predicting
isolated events. The reason is that the diverse causal effects which
make it difficult to predict individual events often interact to yield
surprisingly simple overall patterns.
Consider, for example, one of the most important and foundational
results of statistical theory, called the Central Limit Theorem (CLT).
The CLT tells us that if something we are measuring is the additive
result of a vast number of small and independent influences, then it
will tend to followwhat is called a normal (Gaussian) distribution, or, in
common parlance, a bell-curve. A normal distribution is shaped roughly
as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. (Colour online) A histogram following a normal distribution.
That the distribution is normal tells us about how outcomes will be
dispersed around the mean, e.g. what percentage of the outcomes will
be at any given distance from the average. In a normal distribution,
extreme events are possible but unlikely, and equally likely in either
negative or positive directions. As it happens, this distribution is
ubiquitous: a great many phenomena can be thought of as resulting
from the interaction of innumerable, roughly independent effects.8
8 Good introductions to the CLT include: M. W. Crofton, ‘On the Proof of the Law of
Errors’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society London 160 (1870), pp. 175–87; S.
Page, Diversity and Complexity (Princeton, 2011); H. Tijms, Understanding Probability:
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Various other central limit theorems alter one or more of the
conditions of the CLT, in order to define under what circumstances
a parameter will be characterized by another sort of distribution.
For instance, some important variations introduce interdependence
between the contributing factors, so that if one factor is high this
affects the likelihood of another factor being high as well. Introducing
dependence between variables often results in much greater spread, or
variance, and can have other effects as well.
The CLT and cognate results do not in themselves solve the problem,
but they do point towards an important lesson. The mere fact that
consequences are shaped by vast arrays of causal influences does not
mean that their distributions will be entirely erratic and unpredictable.
On the contrary, it is the very diversity and variety of influences that
turns out to be helpful: what allows a simple macro-level pattern to
emerge is often precisely the fact that the outcomes are determined by
the combined influence of a vast and diverse array of causal effects.9
We should not assume that we are clueless about an overall pattern of
events just because the outcome of each individual event will be shaped
by innumerable causal influences, each of which is quite unpredictable
on its own.
This brings us to a second foundational theorem from statistics,
known as the Law of Large Numbers. The Law of Large Numbers
explains more fundamentally why we can gain power in prediction
by focusing our attention on broader patterns, and then assigning
probabilities to individual events on the basis of these broader patterns.
If we try to predict the outcomes of an isolated few events, chance
influences mean that the resulting patterns may be quite wild and
unpredictable. But the Law of Large Numbers tells us that when it
comes to the outcomes of very large numbers of similar events, the
chance influences will tend to wash out, leaving the overall pattern of
outcomes following the underlying probability distribution, whatever
that may be.10
Chance Rules in Everyday Life (Cambridge, 2007); W. J. Adams, The Life and Times of the
Central Limit Theorem (London, 2009); L. LeCam, ‘The Central Limit Theorem around
1935’, Statistical Science1 (1986), pp. 78–91; S. L. Zabell, Symmetry and its Discontents
(Cambridge, 2005).
9 M. Strevens, Bigger than Chaos: Understanding Complexity through Probability
(London, 2003). See also S. Page, Diversity and Complexity (Princeton, 2011).
10 An important assumption must be made if we are to apply the Law of Large
Numbers: we must assume that we are dealing with the sorts of events for which
it is appropriate to reason as if they are characterized by an underlying probability
distribution (i.e. where it yields predictive power to do so). Just how to determine which
events are reasonably treated as having an underlying probability distribution is a
matter of some dispute. One proposal is that simple behaviour will emerge for complex
systems when the micro-properties affecting the outcome are sufficiently numerous and
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It is because of the Law of Large Numbers that we can predict
accurately the relative frequencies of outcomes that would result
from rolling dice a great many times. It is also because of this law
that we can improve our chances of success on individual rolls by
ascribing to each roll the probabilities characterizing the overall ‘urn’.
If we know the macro-probabilities associated with taking similar acts
many times under similar circumstances, then we will tend to enjoy
successful prediction by regularly assigning those macro-probabilities
to individual events.11
The same holds true when we switch to thinking about more
demanding patterns. It is notoriously difficult to predict weather
more than a short while in advance. Weather systems are chaotic,
which means their behaviour is extremely sensitive to initial starting
conditions. Minute differences in initial conditions can lead to dramatic
differences in the resulting weather. But the climate does not share the
weather’s level of unpredictability. The climate can be understood as
the statistical properties of the weather – it is the ‘urn’ from which
are drawn specific weather events. We know a great deal about the
composition of the urn, and can make strong predictions about weather
events on that basis, even if we are not good at predicting individual
draws. Moreover, we can improve our prediction for individual weather
events by making inferences based on the relative frequencies of the
urn as a whole.
As with dice and weather, so with actions – to an extent. It is easier to
predict overall consequences of patterns of action than it is to predict
precise consequences of individual acts. The eventual consequences
of each act will be influenced by a vast array of separate effects. If
we try to predict the outcome of a given act, we are likely to fail,
because we are unlikely to surmise accurately the state of each of the
factors influencing the outcomes. We are more likely to succeed if we
concentrate on broad patterns of effects following from similar actions
(actual or hypothetical), and then use these as the basis from which to
assign values to individual acts.
We are at a disadvantage with actions, though, compared with
weather and dice, for a number of reasons. The first is that whereas
we have opportunities to observe symmetries of dice and patterns of
independent, or with interdependencies that for one reason or another tend to wash out.
We see below that this happens in the case of climate and dice – indeed, a washing-
out of micro-level influences must happen anytime outcomes in the long run follow a
clear probability distribution. Specifying precisely under what conditions this washing-
out will take place is, however, difficult. Thanks to Michael Strevens for discussion on
these points. Interested readers might see Strevens, Bigger than Chaos and also Page,
Diversity and Complexity.
11 See Strevens, Bigger than Chaos.
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weather, we do not have the opportunity to observe instances of the
total consequences of actions. We only have examples of the discernible
portion of the effects of past actions – that is, the effects for which the
causal relationships are obvious enough for us to pick up on. There
may be many systematic effects that we are not in a good position to
see. They might follow much later, or the causal structures linking our
acts to these effects might be such that the links between our acts and
their consequences are, as Kant puts it, impenetrably obscured from
view.12 For this reason, William Shaw overstates his criticism when he
says that G. E. Moore’s highly cautionary and Lenman-like account of
the problem of practical ethical guidance displays a sort of Humean
scepticism about induction.13 For that to be the case, we would need
past instances of total consequences from which to infer forward, which
we do not have.14
Consider, for example, that it has taken extensive research to uncover
many of the likely environmental effects of increasing CO2 emissions.
Many systematic effects have been obscured from view until relatively
recently, and our understanding of the particular, local-level ecological
changes likely to result from anthropogenic climate change remains
weak in many respects. Another example concerns the fact that we
are often ignorant of the macro effects of our everyday micro-level
economic choices. Patterns of consumption often have far-reaching
economic, social and environmental impacts that are quite invisible
to the consumer. Such examples suggest that our oft-repeated actions
may have obscure, systematic and non-negligible effects that we cannot
observe due to the complexity of causal processes.
Another complication is that although human beings may take or
reject similar actions a large number of times, they will rarely be
acting in just the same circumstances. Diversity in social contextmeans
that superficially similar acts may be systematically different in their
effects: a lie told in one circumstance may be quite different from a
lie told in another. Similar acts that are taken in different contexts
or towards different ends may need to be appraised in different ways.
Sometimes, it will be our actions themselves that cause context and
culture to change. Telling the truth at one point in time may alter
12 I. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (1788). ch. 1.8, theorem IV, remark II.
13 W. Shaw, Moore on Right and Wrong (Dordrecht, 1995).
14 Lenman interprets Moore as being optimistic about action guidance. I do not think
that is right. The passage that Lenman cites comes in the midst of a highly cautionary
account, with Moore vividly portraying the scale of our ignorance. Moore argues that the
assumptions that must hold if we are to give action guidance – namely that unforeseeable
consequences will not overturn foreseeable advantages – are large ones which have never
been shown to be true, and that without them we shall have no hope for practical ethics.
See chapter V of Principia Ethica, and in particular sections 93–100.
Clues for Consequentialists 11
the social context in which people later make their choices around
truth-telling. These considerations raise questions about which act
descriptions are most appropriate – a non-trivial point to which I will
return shortly.
Finally, one of the most serious challenges to guidance for
consequentialists is that although wemay have an accurate impression
of many systematic effects of our actions, we may at the same time
have a profoundly inaccurate impression of the broader context in
which our acts are being taken, and thus of the larger significance
of the consequences we do foresee. Oedipus was not undermined
fundamentally by a failure of prediction.15 He simply acted in ignorance
of the identities of his mother and father. This missing information
radically affected the significance of his actions. The fact that we often
have a limited grasp of the broader contexts of our actions is a serious
challenge indeed, and one that my argument here does nothing to
address.16
These are significant challenges, and they are certainly great enough
to mean that consequentialists should be circumspect in many of their
claims. However, it would be too pessimistic to say that these challenges
leave us clueless. In the final section of this article, I will make some
brief suggestions about the practical implications of my argument for
consequentialists.
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSEQUENTIALISTS
Whether we will be successful in tending to bring about better
consequences will depend on the extent to which we have identified
the effects that systematically tend to result from adopting one sort of
action or strategy rather than another.17 We can say that an eventB is a
systematic effect ofA ifA has a tendency to bring about or promoteB, in
the positive case, or a tendency to inhibit B in the negative case. What
will undermine our prospects for bringing about better consequences
is if the evaluands that look better to us in subjectively expectable
15 J. Bennett makes this observation as well. J. Bennett, The Act Itself (Oxford, 1998).
p. 53.
16 Thanks to Bob Adams for reminding me of the seriousness of this worry.
17 I am using ‘strategy’ as an umbrella term, much in the way that Lenman uses ‘policy’
(p. 343). One sort of strategy (or policy) would be directly to attempt to maximize expected
utility; another would be to adopt a given rule or practical principle; and another would
be to develop a particular aspect of one’s character. A strategy need not be conscious or
intentional (it could simply denote how one goes about things) and it need not aim at
producing good consequences. This is the familiar point that being affectionate out of love
for one’s friend does not aim at the greater good, but a consequentialist can recommend
it as a good way to go about things.
12 Joanna M. Burch-Brown
consequences have sufficient hidden systematic effects working against
us.
We have little chance of identifying the systematic effects of
individual, maximally specified acts. If we assume determinism for
a moment, then the systematic effects of a fully specified act would
just be its actual consequences. (If we could specify fully the starting
conditions and the causal laws, then the objective probabilities would
be 1 for actual consequences, and 0 for all other consequences.) Such
calculations are beyond us. One is hopelessly in the dark when it
comes to predicting the systematic effects of this or that fully specified
instance of not-murder. The presumption, in the case of individual
instantiations, should be of substantial ignorance.
When we switch to reasoning about broader patterns, however, our
capacities for prediction improve. In selecting our actions, therefore,
we should reason using descriptions which are general enough to
allow us to make reliable evaluations, but narrow enough that we do
not exclude useful information. Refine the description too much, and
one will lose the advantage one gains from thinking about statistical
patterns instead of individual, maximally specified acts. Leave the
description too broad, and one will leave out information that would
improve prediction.
Consider this example. Jim is trying to decide whether to lend money
to his friend, Johnny.18 Lendingmoney to friends is often a helpful thing
to do; but Johnny has told Jim that he wants to buy a gun and get back
at Jack. Thus Jim has good reason to think that this particular instance
of lending money to friends is likely to go poorly – it will be far to the
left on the ‘lending money to friends’ distribution. There is no reason
to think that Jim should lend money to Johnny, since he knows enough
to refine the description and foresee that the act will probably turn out
badly – instead, he should use the information he has. The epistemically
best practical principles will be ones based on descriptions optimally
tailored to circumstances – which is to say, ones that are specified just
up to the point where including further information reduces rather
than improves the reliability of our inferences.
It should be emphasized that for many sorts of acts the optimal
level of description will remain rough, rather than fine. In addition
to the epistemic reasons already discussed, there are reasons related
to what have been called ‘expectation effects’ – the positive effects
that result when members of society know that they can trust one
another to act in certain ways and not in others, and the negative
effects that result from the absence of such trust. Societies do better
18 Thanks to Tim Lewens for this example.
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at supporting the flourishing of their members when individuals can
trust exploitation to be prevented, reasonable agreements to be kept,
and conflicts to be handled without violence. These effects would be
undermined if individuals thought that others would be tempted to
violate the relevant norms, or would be able to get away with doing
so. Thus many important practical principles that consequentialists
should favour should take the form of broadly applied social rules.19
What about actions that are fairly unique, not to be repeated many
times? For these we must be more creative, but the consequentialist
should still often have a good deal to say. Here is an example.
In choosing policy responses to climate change, we face particular
difficulties of prediction. Any response sufficient to reduce emissions
substantially will have large-scale systematic effects which we
are in no position to anticipate at the time of deliberation, for
they are bound to involve the alteration of many interdependent,
non-linear, complex adaptive systems. What policies should we
favour?
In these cases, the best strategies might be ones recom-
mending particular methods of risk management, informed by our
best understanding of relevant causal systems. They might include
principles like favouring diversified portfolios of responses where
possible, so that individual systematic errors are less likely to dominate
overall effects.20 Theymight also recommend using cyclical processes of
risk assessment; favouring approaches allowing for later adaptation in
response to new information; requiring certain kinds of transparency
and public accountability, and so on. Or it might be that some of
these processes are too slow-moving to bring about effective changes,
in which case there may be arguments to be made for less incremental
approaches.21 These are debates to be had within the context of the
particular risks beingmanaged. The central point, for present purposes,
is that for actions that are non-repeatable in important respects, we
may often still be able to make reasoned judgements about more
advantageous and less advantageous strategies.
19 On expectation effects, see J. Harsanyi, ‘Morality and the Theory of Rational
Behaviour’, Social Research 44 (1977), pp. 623–56; J. Riley, ‘Defending Rule
Utilitarianism’, Morality, Rules, and Consequences, ed. B. Hooker, E. Mason and D. E.
Miller (Edinburgh, 2000), pp. 40–70; B. Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World (Oxford, 2000).
20 Such considerations might add support to the ‘stabilization wedges’ approach to
climate change mitigation, advocated in S. Pacala and Robert Socolow, ‘Stabilization
Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies’,
Science 305 (2004), pp. 968–72. Thanks to Robert Socolow for this suggestion.
21 Michael Oppenheimer, Robert Keohane and other audience members drew my
attention to this point at the ‘Communicating Uncertainty in Science’ seminar (Princeton
University, December 2012).
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In formulating practical guidance, a consequentialist should
eliminate as useless any strategies we cannot know how to implement
(e.g. ‘take the act with the best actual consequences’) or that are
in other ways impracticable (unrealistic or outside our capacities);
eliminate strategies about whose overall consequences we cannot make
reasonably reliable evaluations; and recommend following whichever
remaining strategies have the best expectable consequences.
To judge whether we stand a chance of picking out the main
systematic effects associated with following a particular strategy, we
should reason about what sorts of causal mechanisms might lead to
hidden systematic effects, and about how likely it is that such causal
mechanisms exist. For many sorts of actions, the hidden systematic
effects seem likely to be great, and our prospects for prediction will
be poor. But for others they seem unlikely to be great, comparatively
speaking, or if great they seem likely to be positively correlated with
effects we foresee. For instance, it is conceivable that murders tend
systematically to have positive results hundreds of years hence, but it
is difficult to imagine what mechanism could cause this pattern. On the
basis of the evidence that murder tends to have terrible consequences,
and the difficulty of imagining countervailing, obscured systematic
benefits, consequentialists are justified in claiming that murder is
wrong. Even if they are unsure about outcomes in individual cases,
they should be confident about the practical principle of prohibiting
murder in all normal sorts of cases. It is with that principle that we
should act.
Finally, the kinds of examples on which Lenman focuses involve
effects that we really should not believe to be systematically associated
with the sorts of acts being considered. In fact, the worry appears
to be that we face overwhelming unpredictability precisely because
the distant effects are not systematically associated with the acts in
question, at least under the incompletely specified descriptions we use
when we deliberate about them. The distant effects on identities of
future agents arise randomly, as often with introducing friends as with
failing to introduce them; as often with murder as with not-murder.
But when we switch to reasoning about broader patterns of action, the
fact that these hidden effects are not systematically associated with
the acts we are considering turns out to work with rather than against
us.
CONCLUSION
Lenman argues that the consequentialist is in no position to provide
practical guidance; the profound unpredictability of consequences
means that consequentialists have only the faintest of grounds for
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recommending one action over another. I have argued that, for reasons
related to statistical theory, Lenman’s account is too pessimistic. The
choice to save a life might occasionally lead, by a perverse chain of
events, to the birth of a future tyrant, but this does not undermine
our basis for giving consequentialist action guidance. Births of distant
tyrants are probably not systematically associated with saving lives,
any more than they are with failing to save lives. Consequentialists
should recommend acting in accordance with the best strategies out of
those for which we are able to evaluate the systematic effects. If similar
decisions are repeated a large number of times, and if we are accurate
in our appraisal of systematic effects, then acting on this basis should
tend to lead to better consequences overall.22
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